Delivered To Your Door

All these persons, sitting alone and isolated in their little houses have no idea that the world is falling apart. They seem shielded. That way, they do not understand what is really going on. The system delivers money and material things, right to their door; so, they cannot see reality. They believe that everything is fine. Everything is fine, but that is  because an efficient system delivers just exactly that appearance.

     So, it's an appearance; everything seems OK. But how do we know that everything is going to be OK? In fact, there may be evidence to the contrary, but a nice big door locks. It blocks their home at the front door.
     The money they have is (of course) made through international trade—the subjection of other peoples through U. S. imperialism, which has been a very successful system, successfully delivering the world into "globalization." It was an old plan, and this has been supported, since the second world war, through a maze of military bases whose value is now being questioned, at least occasionally, by various persons.
     The U. S. thinks it can dominate the whole world, but should you think that everything is going to be OK, what does that mean? It is to say that you don’t see any evidence of that, any contrary evidence. No. Not in your isolated ‘little’ or 'medium' or 'big' house.

You do not even read the newspaper that is delivered to you and that bumps against the bottom of your outside door.

Breathe, Mon!

The Concept of "Economics"

Capitalism is of a liberal nature, it's not conservative at all. However, this does not mean there are not any conservatives in capitalism. Many of the richest participants (or those in capitalism who have the most capital) are conservatives. That does not make the system by nature conservative. Within the "regime of Kapital" there are conservatives, certainly. And not only that, but also there are all kinds of conservatives. Still, the behavior is liberal. Capitalism is by nature more like something that is open, and therefore liberal. So, that is the nature of this phenomenon. (We have understand here that it is a social phenomenon and not in any truly meaningful way an 'individual' phenomenon at all, which means a drastic break with formerly popular ways of viewing it.)
     For example they share. ("They" means the persons participating, and surely capitalism in the end engulfs entire societies. As an example of how participants share: how can you make money without sharing information? There is also close holding of trade secrets, closed social classes of various kinds, etc. But overall, I don't think I am wrong to suggest that capitalism creates a more liberal society, a sharing society.)

     The common behavior pattern of capitalism is of a rather more liberal nature; whereas as  secondary consideration concerns the ideology of capitalism. That becomes bifurcated (into L. & R.)
    
Capitalism gradually increased in influence. Finally, it dominated (above, I say "engulfed") the whole societies within which it was practiced. And as capitalism rose it became gradually clear to the powers of society what was happening. They knew they were becoming capitalistic; they could see something different happening, right before their eyes. What you are now gonna need, then, is this  element of an explanation. People are going to try to create a  theory. In other words: when the society began to understand and integrate this knowledge that capitalist practice was proving to be superior, there was also a very great (and I do not ignore them or belittle them or their interests) conservative element. This element in society then proceeded to create it's version. It wasn't true, but it was a version of what happened. That theory is today called "economics." It also, we should mention, once ran under the rubric, "political economy." In any case what we can say here is that Society (upper classes, so a capital letter!) crafted their own version of what was happening. And: this is what modern "economics" is, when we mean by "economics" the study of what used to be called "political economy." (The contrasting lexical group would be the business and trade behaviors as such, the "phenomena" of capitalism.)

Generally speaking, all phenomena are subject to interpretation, or certainly most phenomena so long as there is a subjective element. Thus, what a capitalistic society says about capitalism is one particular interpretation.

accepting and rejecting the neo-Classical approach in economics

(Kaldor, “theories of value and distribution” ; Introductory chapter ; 1960)

When Nicholas Kaldor says, in 1960, “the conditions under which…”, he means cerebral. Those “conditions” are cerebral as they are not found in the manifest, physical world. Kaldor also seems on related territory when he mentions “abstract” and “a-priori,” in this introduction to volume 1 of his collected “essays” (“Collected Economic Essays”; 1980).

     In telling us all about his earlier life as a neo-classical fellow (he studied under Lionel Robbins at the LSE), we are given to understand that the goal is to determine economic equilibrium: “the factors determining economic equilibrium,” or the conditions of economic equilibrium. As a purely private scholar-economist my own view puts me in a different place. My economics takes me to a different place. I assume rather the opposite. To me, there aren’t any such factors or conditions: the concept doesn't seem to apply. The difference is in where we start from. We find ourselves back to the consideration of assumptions; and, we may question them, we may try to get a read on how different people assume different things. Assumptions do not merely need to be assumed. Rather we can get some bearings on where we are at with them. So, Kaldor seems to keep saying the same things. I mentioned the word "conditions," and there is also “that abstract world.” Another bit from Kaldor is where he mentions generalisations that are “derived from a few self-evident postulates alone.” I also noticed the word, “static.” 

     In his “introduction to volume one” Kaldor does really a quite excellent job of stating the whole nest of problems that relate to the self-generated neo-classical mental world (as of 1960). He discusses what he and other economists believed in economics, in the 1930s. But Kaldor eventually rejected it; and, this I hasten to add, took a while. So; He is someone who both accepted and rejected the neo-classical system of thought. Quite a feat. Most of us do one or the other, but not both, while Mr.  Kaldor first accepted then rejected.

     There also could be someone who first rejected, then decided that, if looked at more carefully, there could be a little sense to it. Not much, some. Why else would anyone have believed in it?

     Let us now read through the 1933 paper (“The Determinateness…”) in order to get, only, sentence six. This reads:

     For in any analytical study, forces whose laws of operation are known must clearly be separated from others in whose behavior [things are, Um—not so well known] and the only satisfactory way to detect and account for the influence of the latter [what he said, above, which I chose to omit, was, actually, “uniform principles” and he is en-quoting these words himself] in the real world is by assuming them away and examining what events would be like in their absence. It is, moreover, only by employing this “method of difference” [as before: the author is en-quoting his own wording] that we can hope gradually to extend the range of phenomena over which we can make generalisations.

     

     The excerpt, which I have slightly tampered with, provides us with perhaps a good example of how the more intelligent sort of neo-classical practitioner thinks (in – for example – the thirties).

     How are these “forces of operation” to be “known”? What does he mean by “known”? I would like to point out, firstly, that they are known to the economist. And what does Kaldor mean by forces (I will choose to accept “forces” here) whose laws are “known”? I want to discuss this sentence here as one which seems to invite an enormous, devastating criticism. How are these bits (or laws) known? When the “forces whose laws of operation are known [or not]” are divided into the two categories Kaldor gives (this known and the unknown stuff echoes Donald Rumsfeld, for reasons I don't know anything about), even without considering them we are able to see that both of the two categories are to be known strictly through self-referential, internal exercises. The problem is that, first, some of these laws – those that are not known – are omitted. We can accept that. Fine, then, the only way for us is to omit them. But what are left are things that are known cerebrally. Since that is so, both categories are self-referential, both are merely internal, cerebral, self-generated “knowledge.” It is all happening inside the head.

     The “static,” the “a-priori,” the cerebral—this constitutes everything he calls “known.” The division into two parts is thus in my view absurd. The “forces...are known”, claims Kaldor. Yes, but as a thought exercise. There is, he claims, a case where the “behavior of things” (my own en-quotation) is not known. In the other case, they are. This exists as a contrast to the other case. In the latter case, “forces” or “laws” are not known, they are to be assumed away because of this. So it is the case that where “there is no ‘uniform principle’” we are justified to assume these things away and then what is left are those “forces,” or “laws,” that are known. We have assumed away some things that are not known, but that is alright (we could say valid, or scientific) since it is the case that “forces whose laws of operation” are known are taken into consideration (and this has to be done, I suppose, in a most scientific manner).

     When we ask how they were known, we see they were known only by the mind. Yet this same mind also assumed away other phenomena. Or “forces,” which could mean many things, really, including “behaviors,” which word may not have been so commonplace in the thirties, compared to today, in psychology and economics, among other places. So, the objection here is that what is “known” (according to Kaldor’s view as of the 1930s) are the behaviors—presumably something like buying and selling. These are known by mind, by the mind—only that. There is a backstory here. We are looking at something. Some persons looked at some others persons who were engaged in buying and selling practices—trade, in other words. That person then calls himself an economist. He says that he (or she--however I do not see the females who “know” these things) knows things. That’s great; but, what? That which she “knows” turns out to be assumptions. Everything comes from the same place—the mind.

     How about turning it around? Wouldn’t it be much better to assert rather that we do not know exactly what is going on in this buying/selling world? This world we call, for lack of a better name, economics. That is not what they do. These men say: “we do know.”

     This is the kind of assertion they make, but when we look? Then it is clear that nothing is really known. It is assumption after assumption, case after case of merely listing possible realities or assumptions. What is actually known is much less than Kaldor’s use of the word “known” would seem to indicate. From observation of the world, what we know, is this. Persons are in fact buying and selling things to each other. They sell a lot of things. They almost always use money, too, so that not only are goods transferred. Also money is. Many times the monies used are obtained on credit, and this is where bankers come into it. More we do not know. We do not know that (these are Kaldor’s examples, numerically listed to the number of six, in this first piece) “a closed economy” can be assumed, or that there is “perfect knowledge,” or that there is “perfect competition.” (Kaldor also has something called “direct exchange,” which seems to be another conceptual necessity to make all of this stuff function properly.) Then he adds a fifth and sixth consideration as regards problems involving time, and concludes by saying “these assumptions we may thus regard as the ‘accepted framework’ of static theory…” (We should note another self-en-quotation.) He then adds that in the case where there are those who (even in the thirties) contest this framework, they do so in a particular way. (It has to do with the word “determinateness,” b.t.w., where, once again, even the very word “determinateness” apparently needs to be self-en-quoted.) This seems to be Kaldor’s practice (of putting things in quote markings), but I want to say that he is a very thorough person and clearly has given much thought and study to these things that he at one time accepted, later rejects.

So, once again, my problem with Kaldor’s presentation is that everything is determined by the mind, including both the category of what laws by which forces act or what forces we are able to know, and that other set of complimentary forces or laws or behaviors we don't know. The result is we have no way to say where one is to make the cut. Yet such a division into two categories is defended, this in the opening paragraph of “introduction to volume one.” There is nothing, or almost nothing, that is “known” or else on the other hand somehow suffers from something like “no uniform principle,” which allows us to leave those factors off since both are uniform. This is because both come from the mind, nowhere else. And if there are some phenomena of economics that are validly known, it is just these general everyday observations. All businessmen know about that. In fact, all of the fancier things (that only the economist knows) like “forces,” factors, laws, behaviors and whatever are creations of mind. And since these are cerebral only, my argument is that none can be “known” any more than any other. There is nothing definitively known at all—nothing to base a science on.

     I feel that, properly understood, this is very important refutation of ideas within the area of economics. The “known” forces are just as mysterious as the “unknown” forces, and everything collapses with that observation. His confidence in “forces whose laws of operation are known” is clearly mistaken. We see it when we ask about how they are “known” at all.

For in any analytical study, forces whose laws of operation are known must clearly be separated from others in whose behavior no such “uniform principles” have yet been detected; and the only satisfactory way to detect and account for the influence of the latter in the real world is by assuming them away and examining what events would be like in their absence.

    

   

Note: Kaldor, “essays on value and distribution,” second ed; Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc; New York; 1982

Big Mainstream Grocery Store

Go into a/the big, mainstream grocery store/supermarket. There they sell 200 magazines – you'll notice that they have no Harpers, nor The Atlantic. But the conservo’s (this is a technical designation I use that replaces the term "conservatives" for me, although also in this case I could say the "mainstream people..." ~ ) do have a philosophy: Consumption-Enjoyment-Simplicity-Money.
     Ah, what geniuses they are! The ideological doctrine here might say that life logically centers around mundane consumer goods, with due consideration for those acts that will be needed for obtaining them—the process of payment. This brings up the matter of money, since these consumer goods are to be obtained through payment, which means "money." The problem is: it does not work. Or, we can say it doesn’t "apply." (I mean it doesn't "apply" to real life.) Of course not. You can pretend it does. But.
     If there is actually such an ideology of "mundane consumer goods" and you pretend this philosophy applies -- or works -- applies to real life -- that is dangerous, for you are pretending that "the only ideological doctrine in town" is relevant. It isn't. Is that healthy? No. Because this would lead to cultural suicide. Let us now restate the point; it is important. There is perhaps such an implicit doctrine — (mundane consumer goods and spending) — it is supposed to apply to real life. Right-O. Does it? No. If it comes up short; if it is ideology, then the sooner we realize it, the better. So, this "mundane" doctrine involving free market consumer goods probably does not apply to real life. The sooner we realize that the better it is for us.
     We can always look at what it says. Even if it does not make perfect sense we should also look at what the philosophy says. We now do that. We will now look at what the philosophy says, or what it would say, if it existed! What it would assert to the public is: Government owes persons nothing. Since this theory of economics "truly exists" it mean it will all be solved by the private market, so the implicit meaning is ---  Government owes persons nothing and everything should be solved by the private market (it is not private, but, as we said, it is not a very good theory anyways, the word "private" becoming now another intangible that only reflects what people say).
     The view itself is lame; it crumbles. Nevertheless, it is inevitable that these persons in capitalism who are operating this supermarket project some kind of view. We may pick that up. We pick this up in various ways. This seems to be what was happening, for me, when I looked at their big, mainstream supermarket and even when I saw the magazine rack (as an offhand remark, I would suppose that the magazines reflect the lifestyle proposed by the ideology). As a result of these considerations, we see that the view that the market should solve everything is more like some kind of myth. It is something the society makes use of in a practical way. The application to the real world is in fact weak, hence it does not "apply," it is mythic: We tell stories, stories about markets.
     The word "market" is important here. A awful lot seems to hinge on a word. But when we examine it, we find certain things that seem curious. We do not find "the" market. So. Maybe "a" market works better? I always like to try the indefinite rather than definite article, "a" market could replace "the" market. The problem is, I get stuck. Unlike most language matters. Mostly, language questions seem to naturally resolve themselves. Not here. This is one I am not able to resolve so easily. Recently, I saw a new phrase: "market phenomena," from Boldizzoni (he is in Italy.) Perhaps we should say "market phenomena." Oh hell! (I just get frustrated sometimes.)
     What is it with these guys? It seems to me that they do not have any basic knowledge of what they are doing. They lack the explanation that "applies," but the fact that it does not really apply to the real world is not something that will us from creating ideology. So that is what they are able to produce. We should also understand the importance of having an ideology. There has to be some kind of an explanation, and the magazine rack somehow seemed to reflect that, for me.

To change the subject here a little, what do we need? What is really needed, I think, are public educational services. Again, it may seem that there is such a "truly existing" thing. But I think that what the mainstream or existing method does not do is provide public educational services. In other words, they say they do but that is ideology again. (It's all a part of a situation of social propaganda and ideology.) Those are public services I want. These are not private services. We already alluded to what "private" might mean. But now, I mean to say, definitely, public services. This may be conceptually distinguished from the private profit method. In any case, the matter of providing services is vital, and the more "educational" type of service is not getting out to people. So, it's a big deal; the services are not being provided. (Not if all we get are the silly magazines that I share try to list eventually, so you can see what I saw, at the store.) But we know about the kind of services that are motivated by profits. We know about 'Big Corporations,' but we are just not quite sure what they are. Now, John Kenneth Galbraith used to say they were institutions. Others say "private" enterprise. Private? How so? Where is the explanation? Private? The companies depend on their stock price. That is a public matter, isn't it? We do know that they are motivated by mega-profits! This eliminates the average person, who probably gets few of those "megas." The profit is not the common customers' concern. The shopper, the customer, is not very likely to be a shareholder, or on the board. (He could conceivably be one – OK, maybe he is a "major" stockholder). Maybe there is some public participation, but this is about the profits, and the bigness, and therefore of little interest. That is of interest to the institutions, and not of any interest to those persons just doing some shopping!
    
So, public educational institutions would be my suggested alternative, I guess my thought process when I changed the subject just somehow linked itself to that since such a service is definitely not being provided by the system in place now. [See my upcoming post for the names of all those magazines! What I can say right now is that "Einstein" was the only magazine I was even at all interested in—it was next to "John Wayne."]

Social Networking and Capitalism (Are Historical or Authentic Capitalism AND Social Networks Related?)

You would be correct if you were to say about Linked-In that it is, or must be, intended for social interaction. That is so. But we need to ask a little more about this. What kind? To give a preliminary answer, Linked-In is designed, quite intentionally, leaves out any social interactions that do not involve money.

     Having said that, we need to discriminate between social interactions. Let's discuss two kinds. There are more, but we need to identify social interactions in a preliminary way first. And first, there are the social interactions connected with money outcomes, or the interactions measured by money. Second, social interactions of another kind: these are social interactions that do not have this type of linkage. These are two preliminary kinds of social interaction. If we say that even  the latter are part of capitalism, then even this un-money-linked kind of relation is, really, another part of capitalism, the non-market part of capitalism. It can be linked with capitalism even if it does not have this money interest, which is to say not directly.

.

Another way to put across the same idea is that capitalism does NOT have such a separation, or that the money-related and non money-related "really" are the same thing. This is very tricky; maybe you get the idea. Capitalism is about (not individualism and private properties but) social interaction but not always. It's very tricky! What is important is to understand that, when looking at the period of history characterized as capitalistic we may understand that capitalism does not operate as a system that is sequestered to only the money or trading kind of person. Capitalism exists in an entire society, a society featuring certain characteristically "capitalist" processes. ("Socialists" are capitalists.) If it is social, then capitalism comprises the persons in the society. Other kinds of persons are involved, but (rather than classes) these two kinds of socializing are mixed up together, so it is one system.
     Therefore, I hope it is clear that the 'social' network LinkedIn does NOT reproduce the social network of capitalism at all, or not of the kind of capitalism that actually developed historically.  The social networks or social foundations were fully integrated with human society as it was then----not put up on a "social network," which is by comparison an artificiality. Thus, the social network of Linked-In is not the social network of (historical) capitalism.

Linked-In is not capitalism.

(second version of a recent post)

Marx and Engels thought that the capitalist system was bound to fail. They believed that, definitely, it would do so. Of course, this is one of their most famous predictions! They also specified details of how that failure was to happen. Here the “proletariat” were involved. But this did not occur, or not so far and not in that precise way. It still may happen; there may be such a systemic failure. But, in any case, the situation is quite different. Whatever explanations there are, they need to account for this difference. The explanations marx and Engels adhered are somewhat, it is safe to say, insufficient.

     How are we to understand the miracle of capitalism? If we fail to understand what it is that is at the basis, or what the basis is, we won't be able to understand the capitalism which is the result. So, I want to take the position, here, that we need to know the basis: what the basis is. Otherwise you are going back to your old position which is one of no understanding. Capitalism is difficult to explain, and there are alternate explanations of “basis.” But, I think we need a basis... What follows is only one way to approach it ... a ... way.

     I contend that capitalism is based on such differences as may exist. There are actors, and these simply comprise the relevant population or society. In fact they are what are called economic actors or players. For example, rich and poor, owners and workers are "actors" in the economic system. These are persons who are different from one another, either individually or as different groups, since individuals may comprise any of various kinds of groups. As to difference: we witness that as time goes by there is the illusion of a leveling of the playing field. There at least seems to be such a leveling. Differences with regard to capitalistic society seem to be reducing. Regarding it as apparent, not real, is helpful. It corresponds to the Picketty narrative, of course. It helps us to remain open-minded. Thus do we investigate this real or apparent tendency that implies a movement towards reduction of difference. Thus, we are allowed to retain our skepticism. (Of course, if the whole "basis" really is difference, then eliminating the basis might also eliminate capitalism.)

     With that in mind, we may observe the way in which average citizens come to eventually realize that, due to society's glorious progress, they too can enter the field of play and be part of the great market, in a bigger way! Again: what is at stake is reality vs. illusion. This had actually been true for a long time---in some sense. But now we see! Now the public realized! That is one possible interpretation, among many. The markets opened up and everyone got the chance to prosper. But if the public did not know that they could do this, in what sense do I was it actually true? Add to this the observation that the United States of America is almost from the beginning based on giving people, citizens, more freedom and we see that it translates to the freedom to work where one pleases, at the career of one's choice, or start one's own business should one want to, or have the energy. But technically it's possible. Under what conditions can "anyone" "succeed in America"?

     The apparent leveling of the playing field does not mean the playing field is level and even more so it does not mean that capitalism proceeded from any such historical basis. What, then, is the real nature of the level playing field? What is the "level playing field principle"? So, here we can return to our basis idea that it is just the opposite, and what capitalism actually requires is difference.

     The situation today is better described as ambiguous. There is a level on which persons are newly seeing the way that capitalism can (Or, alternatively: capitalism apparently can) dissolve differences and thus all they need to do is be the proverbial “nice guys” and they get the proverbial, much-vaunted “good life.” That may be so, and certainly that is what “they” want you to believe. But at the same time, you could listen to what I am saying here. Coexisting with all the apparent “facts” is quite the opposite “fact,” which is the precise idea that capitalism happens only when the actors are different.
     How can both things be true? They could---if the nature of the situation is ambiguous one. So, the "basis" I am looking for is not only difference. It is also that of ambiguity. We see how complex capitalism is. It never led to a crash due the isolation of a class of "proletarians."